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INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE: CHINA’S CADRE SYSTEM
APPLIED TO WATER QUALITY
Wyatt F. Golding†
Abstract: The Chinese government has struggled to enforce environmental law,
due in part to local protectionism. In an attempt to overcome local protectionism, the
2008 Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution uses the cadre system to
incentivize local officials to enforce national water quality standards. This comment
argues that the cadre system presents a pragmatic means of attaining enforcement of
quantified environmental standards because it implements the already existing Chinese
Communist Party’s system of vertical hierarchy that has proven relatively successful in
achieving other social goals. The cadre system, however, will only produce clean water
over the long-term if it incentivizes political support and funding for environmental
protection agencies to create accurate quantified water quality data. Moreoever, China’s
use of the cadre system in combating water pollution signals a move toward a political
rather than legal solution and will further centralize Chinese Communist Party power,
thus limiting transparency, democracy, and public involvement.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, it appeared that China would employ the judiciary to
solve a deepening environmental crisis.1 However, the Chinese government,
under the leadership of the Central Communist Party (“CCP”), is moving
away from rule of law towards a tighter embrace of political solutions.2 To
increase the accountability of political officials, the CCP employs an
incentive structure, known as the cadre system, that functions as a market
solution within a political context. This paper analyzes the history and
context of the cadre system as employed in the 2008 amended version of the
Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution and argues that while
the system as currently employed disenfranchises the Chinese people, it
pragmatically applies the strongest governing force currently possible in
China and has strong potential for achieving cleaner water. This paper also
argues that the Communist Party should implement more public involvement
in the cadre system, in order to broaden enforcement, involve citizens, and
strengthen political support.
†
J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011. Many thanks to
Professor Bill Rodgers, Professor Dongsheng Zang, Professor Carl Minzner, Amanda Maus, Albert
Buchman, and Sarah Jordan for their support, insight, and editing.
1
See Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Law in China: Lessons Learned from the U.S.
Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 (2007).
2
See generally Randall Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts: Legalized Governance
Judicialization and Dejudicialization in China, (La Trobe U. Sch. of L., Paper No. 2008/10), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265147.
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Environmental laws and legal enforcement have failed to
meaningfully prevent water pollution in China. The National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) promulgated the Law
on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (“LPCWP”) in 1984,3 yet
poor water quality continues to wreak significant economic, health, and
ecological damage. In 1997, the World Bank calculated that damage from
air and water pollution cost China fifty-four billion U.S. dollars annually, or
eight percent of gross domestic product.4 Sixty percent of the surface water
from sampling sites in the nation’s seven major rivers is unfit for fishing or
swimming,5 while over ninety percent of the groundwater in wells in eastern
provinces is unsuitable for drinking.6 A steep decline in aquatic biodiversity
captured the world’s attention in 2006, when a six-week survey found that
the Yangtze River dolphin, the “goddess of the Yangtze,” had gone extinct
due to water pollution.7
The critical question in the face of these failures is why China’s
regime of relatively developed8 environmental protection laws has been
unsuccessful. Scholars widely agree that the primary answer is a principalagent problem, dubbed local protectionism.9 There is a two-part cause to
this widespread problem.10
First, legislation in China is generally
aspirational and vague, and enforced within a legal system that lacks
effective vertical hierarchy.11 This legal context gives great enforcement
discretion to local officials.
Second, local officials exercise their
3
Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
May
11,
1984),
available
in
English
at
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109915.htm
(last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
4
WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES 23 (World Bank 1997).
5
WORLD BANK, ADDRESSING CHINA’S WATER SCARCITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTED
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 11 (World Bank 2009); see also The Asia Water Project: China,
Water Crisis, http://www.asiawaterproject.org/water-crises/water-facts/surface-water-pollution.
6
Id.
7
Peter Ritter, Farewell to the Yangtze River Dolphin, TIME MAG., Aug. 10 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1651819,00.html.
8
Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing Efforts to Develop an
Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 569, 581 (2003). The author quotes
a Chinese environmental protection official as saying “China has a wealth of laws with shallow roots.” Id.
at 588.
9
Id. (listing sources). Local protectionism has long been a problem in environmental enforcement
in the United States, and spurred the growth of federal legislation and a developed national regulatory
system. See PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 64 (Cambridge 1991); see also Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive
Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53, 113 (2009).
10
Xin Qiu & Honglin Li, Super Ministry Reform, Background, Challenges, and the Future, 39 Env.
L. Inst. 10152, 10160 (2009), available at www.epa.gov/ogc/china/xin.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
11
Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and
Political Campaigns, 37 DEVEL. & CHANGE 57, 60 (2006).
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enforcement discretion to protect local economic interests rather than
implementing national environmental legislative purposes.12
The Chinese government functions with two separate, but intertwined
institutions: the government and the CCP. The CCP is a functionally
unopposed political organization with selective membership that develops
and places government officials. The cadre system is a means of
documenting and incentivizing attainment of goals by CCP officials.
Higher-level officials attach personal, political, and monetary accountability
to water quality attainment by tying attainment of goals to individual party
members’ or cadres’ success within the CCP and to monetary rewards. The
cadre system also establishes joint and several liability for failures. In this
system, local officials must take whatever measures necessary to meet
nationalized standards in order to retain and increase their political stature.
In 2008, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee attempted to
eliminate the negative effects of local protectionism on water quality by
implementing the cadre system, outlined in Article Five of the LPCWP.13
Use of the cadre system is attractive because applying strict and joint
liability within an existing vertical structure simplifies oversight and allows
local flexibility in the method used to attain concrete goals. However,
because of the complexity of water quality attainment and economic
tradeoffs, the cadre system alone will produce reactionary, short-term results.
Sustainable water quality will be meaningfully attained only to the extent
that 1) the cadre system incentivizes funding and the creation of political
space for local and regional enforcement agencies, called Environmental
Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”), and 2) the EPBs create accurate data to ensure
accountability.
Part II provides background for the political history and context of
the cadre system. Part III provides an analysis of the likely effectiveness of
implementation. Part IV argues that long-term water quality attainment
requires a developed environmental enforcement agency, and that the cadre
system should officials to provide greater political space and funding for
those agencies. Part V comments on the opaque and centralized nature of

12

Id. at 61.

13

Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
May
11,
1984),
available
in
English
at
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109915.htm (last visited Dec.
19, 2010). The amendments also modified regulations, implemented the country’s first national permitting

system, attached personal liability to actors in polluting entities, and strengthened the position of civil legal
aid groups in citizen suit litigation. See Dawn Winalski, Note, Cleaner Water in China?, 24 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG., 181, 185 (2009).
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the cadre system, and provides suggestions for methods of incorporating
public input. Part VI concludes.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE CADRE SYSTEM IS A PROVEN SOLUTION FOR A
PRESSING NEW PROBLEM

Water pollution is a pressing problem in China. In this Part, Section A
describes China’s problems with water pollution and early legal efforts to
combat it. Section B describes the framework by which the Ministry of
Environmental Protection attempts to enforce environmental laws. Finally,
Section C describes the history and implementation mechanisms of the cadre
system.
A.

Legal Efforts to Combat Water Pollution Have Proven Insufficient

In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began
privatization and what is now known as the Chinese economic miracle.
Markets and foreign domestic investment mushroomed, causing GDP per
capita to increase more than twenty-fold from $84 in 1984 to $2,034 in
2007.14 As that growth was based largely on industry and factory
production, environmental degradation occurred on an unprecedented scale
over the same time period.
In coordination with this degradation, China instituted several
environmental laws. In 1978, the National People’s Congress added Article
6, Section 1 to the Chinese constitution, providing that “the state protects
and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.”15 Rivers and
other bodies of water are state property subject to state control.16 Also in
1978, the National People’s Congress passed the Environmental Protection
Law (for trial implementation), which required related departments in the
central government, as well as all provincial and municipal governments, to
establish environmental protection institutes.17 This framework resulted in
serious issues surrounding conflict of laws, as each level of government
created differing environmental quality standards.

14

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 430 (2008). Figures are exchange rate based.
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153; see also XIANFA art. 11 (1978), available at
http://xfx.jpkc.gdcc.edu.cn/show.aspx?id=289&cid=27 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
16
MA JUN, CHINA’S WATER CRISIS 28 (Nancy Yang Liu & Lawrence R. Sullivan trans., EastBridge
2004).
17
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153.
15
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Since the establishment of this framework, the National People’s
Congress has passed environmental legislation at a rate paralleling economic
growth and international integration. From 1979 to 1984, China introduced
only six new environmental laws. However, after 1984, China promulgated
thirty-two environmental laws, including laws directed at the prevention of
pollution by solid waste, the prevention and control of atmospheric
pollution; soil and water conservation, energy production, and mineral
mining.18 These laws addressed domestic environmental issues and
responded to international treaty obligations.19
Thirty years after constitutional recognition of the obligation of the
State to protect natural resources, epic water pollution remains, resulting
from widespread institutional failure. The State Environmental Protection
Agency graded water on a scale from I to V, I being pure and safe to drink,
IV usable only for industry and farming, and V unusable for any purpose and
unsafe to touch. In 2005, the agency took 411 monitoring sections for
surface water in seven major water systems throughout the country,
including the Yangtze River and the Yellow River. The section ratios in
levels I through III, levels IV through V, and inferior level V were forty-one
percent, thirty-two percent, and twenty-seven percent, respectively.20 In
2007, eleven of the twenty-eight major lakes were grade V.21 The China
Watch Institute reported in 2006 that seventy percent of the nation’s rivers
were moderately contaminated.22 While these statistics are shocking, they
were likely underreported. A 2009 Ministry of Environmental Protection
(“MEP”) report suggested that previous pollution figures have been severely
conservative, in that they did not account for agricultural waste in
determining chemical oxygen demand. The volume of discharge of water
pollutants is about double previous estimates.23

18

Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 298 (2007).
19
Id.
20
State Environmental Protection Administration, 2005 China Environment Status Gazette: Fresh
Water Environment, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/plan/zkgb/05hjgb/200607/t20060727 91443.htm.
21
Jingyun Li & Jingjing Liu, China Environment Forum, Quest for Clean Water: China’s Newly
Amended
Water
Pollution
Control
Law
4-5,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/water_pollution_law_jan09.pdf.
22
Zijun Li, China’s Rivers: Frontlines for Chemical Wastes, CHINA WATCH INST., Feb. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3884 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
23
Jonathan Ansfield & Keith Bradsher, China Report Shows More Pollution in Waterways, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/world/asia/10pollute.html.
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B.

Local Protectionism and Limited Resources Continue to Hamper
Environmental Enforcement

Under the legislative branch, ministries, administrations, and agencies
oversee the implementation of law. They act as a regulatory branch at every
level alongside CCP officials, who are responsible for general governance
and allocation of funds.
In 1979, to implement the Environmental Protection Law, the
National People’s Congress created the State Environmental Protection
Agency, which it upgraded to the State Environmental Protection
Administration (“SEPA”) in 1998.24 In 2008, the National People’s
Congress acknowledged the growing necessity for effective environmental
regulation by again, enhancing the power of the environmental agency in the
national government.25 The Standing Committee of the 10th National
People’s Congress elevated SEPA to ministry-level status, as the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (“MEP”).26 This increased stature allows the
MEP to regulate formerly higher-ranking development ministries, provides
long-term stability to the ministry, and allocates a vote in State Council
proceedings.27 Despite the promotion, the creation of the MEP does not
address weaknesses in vertical hierarchy and local implementation of
national law and policy, as structural conflicts between economic
development and environmental protection persist.28
The MEP is charged with the enforcement of environmental law, with
significant overlap with related departments.29 Under the MEP, provincial,
municipal, and county-level EPBs actually monitor conditions and
implement fines.30 There is vertical hierarchy within the EPBs, but under
the 1989 Environmental Protection Law, the EPBs are also accountable to
the people’s government at the same level.31 Because each level of EPB has
jurisdiction over emitters within its area, for any problem there are at least
four sources of authority for enforcement (the three levels of EPBs, and at
least the county-level people’s government). This has resulted in ambiguity
and conflicting goals of enforcement, further complicated by the fact that
while environmental enforcement is under the purview of the MEP, the
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153.
Id. at 10152.
Id. at 10153.
Id.
Id. at 10160.
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10158.
Id. at 10160.
Id. at 10158.
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Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine oversees
national environmental standards, and the Ministry of Water Resources
defines the environmental function of each body of water.32
Enforcement of environmental laws is limited and sporadic due to the
conflicting governmental goals of development and conservation, struggles
with corruption and localization, and severely limited resources. Local
government officials strive to increase development as a foremost goal, both
to meet evaluation criteria and to provide funds for the localized tax
system.33
Even in instances where the political will exists for enforcement,
resources are limited. For example, in 1998 in Shanghai, China’s most
populous and one of its wealthiest, most modern, and most international
cities, pollution inspectors working full time could not manage to visit each
factory within the city even once a year. When officials reported violations
and assessed fees, they collected only twelve percent of those fees. The
municipal EPB, with only three attorneys, lacked the resources to criminally
prosecute violations or sue for fees. In contrast, New York State, which has
roughly the equivalent population of Shanghai, has ninety-eight state
attorneys dedicated to environmental protection in addition to thirty-seven
environmental attorneys in the attorney general’s office.34 Wang Canfa, the
director of China’s only environmental legal aid non-governmental
organization, Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV),
estimated in 2005 that only ten percent of China’s environmental law is
enforced.35
Enforcement has even been difficult against the government itself.
Powerful state-owned entities that are large enough to absorb fee costs rather
than reforming behavior further undermine enforcement efforts.36 These
entities, prior to the ascension of the MEP, have freely ignored
environmental standards under the protection of superior political rank.37
Even when acknowledging environmental fines, many of these entities
flagrantly violate laws based on a strictly economic calculus, finding it is
cheaper to occasionally pay fees than to implement new technology.38 This
32

Id. at 10159.
Id. at 10160.
34
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK 36, 111-13 (Cornell Univ. Press 2004).
35
Embassy of China, China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Laws, http://www.chineseembassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t214565.htm.
36
Wang Minyuan, China’s Pollutant Discharge Permit System Evolves—Behind Its Economic
Expansion, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 95, 100-01 (2008).
37
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10155.
38
See generally Wang, supra note 36.
33

406

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 2

behavior is responsible for severe pollution and encourages massive-scale
violation by both private and government actors.39 For instance, in 2005, the
then-SEPA issued a list of thirty major national construction projects that
violated the 2003 Environmental Impact Assessment Law and enjoined their
continuation.40 The Three Gorges Dam Project Company, as well as twentyeight other companies, completely ignored the injunctions and completed the
projects.41
Despite severe limitations, there is a general trend toward stronger
rule of law and more comprehensive regulation and enforcement, spurred on
by increasing activism, regulatory inertia, and international pressure. Since
starting in 1998, CLAPV has registered over 10,000 complaints and pursued
over 100 cases, some with as many as 1,700 plaintiffs.42 During the same
period, state agencies have gradually increased compliance. Prior to the
2008 amendments to the LPCWP, China created a localized water pollutant
discharge permitting system under an earlier version of the LCPCWP and
strengthened by the 2004 Administrative Permit Law.43 Between 1996 and
2000, Chinese cities roughly doubled the number of permitted polluters and
discharges, with some resulting increase in water quality.44 Furthermore,
international bodies and foreign investors are increasingly demanding
improved environmental regulation. China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) carries explicit obligations to develop a certain degree
of transparency and provide legal remedies, at least in the commercial
context.45 However, rule of law is increasingly limited, and the above
examples are exceptions to the paramount power of political control.
C.

The CCP and Its Cadre System Provide a Political Enforcement
Structure

China is a civil law state guided by a Constitution. Legislative power
is implemented through the National People’s Congress, which was created

39

Id.
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10155.
41
Id.
42
Austin Ramzy, Heroes of the Environment, TIME MAG., Oct. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1663317_1663320_1669921,00.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2011).
43
Winalski, supra note 13, at 188-90.
44
In 1996, Chinese cities that implemented the water pollutant discharge permit system issued
41,720 pollutant discharge permits to 42,412 enterprises; in 2000, 71,027 enterprises obtained 80,899 water
pollutant discharge permits, and the number of enterprises that obtained pollutant discharge permits had
risen to over 80,000 by the end of 2002. Wang, supra note 36, at 102.
45
Goldman, supra note 1, at 253.
40
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by the Constitution.46 Despite the Constitution, the fundamental law that
informs all of China’s institutions is the leadership of the CCP with
multiparty cooperation.47 While the CCP is not a per se constitutional
authority, it is the de facto supreme power and enforces one-party rule.48
The CCP serves as a parallel power structure that ensures implementation
and enforcement of law,49 according to its own Constitution and
regulations.50 The LPCWP is unusual in that it statutorily invokes CCP
implementation, which is generally assumed as an underlying premise of
legislation.51 Article 5 stipulates that “the fulfillment of water environmental
protection targets constitutes to be a part of the performance evaluation of
local people’s governments or their responsible persons.”52 The cadre
system is a formal evaluation system used by superiors within the Party to
measure officials’ performance. The CCP uses it to incentivize a variety of
goals, resulting in complex ‘report cards’ for officials, with points allotted
according to the import of a policy in a certain area.53 Prior to the LPCWP,
the CCP invoked the cadre system to incentivize reforesting of fallow
fields,54 but otherwise has not applied it to environmental legislation.
The priorities within the evaluation serve as a political structure that
can both enhance and conflict with legislation by determining the conduct of
state agents. Evaluations attach strict liability for positive or negative results
to a political official, serving as an efficient hierarchical means of
concretizing state policies and controlling the actions of the roughly sixty
million state employees.55 In some instances, officials are grouped and
considered collectively responsible for the performance of any individual, in
both professional and private life.56 Officials who meet established goals are
rewarded with promotions, bonuses, and public praise. This system not only
46

Id.
Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constituutions: A New Approach to the Study of
Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12, 23 (2010).
48
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6 (Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, Jan
Michiel Otto eds., Kluwer Law Int’l. 2002).
49
Jiang, supra note 47, at 27 (quoting Deng Xiaping, “without the Party laws and regulations, it
would be hard to ensure that state laws are enforced”).
50
See Full Text of Communist Party of China, Seventeenth National Party Congress of the
Communist Party of China, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm.
51
Jiang, supra note 47, at 23-27.
52
Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, art. 5 (2008).
53
Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,
in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 101, 102-03 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2004).
54
Id. at 105.
55
Id. at 67.
56
Id. at 72 (citing example of instance in which an entire bureau lost annual bonuses because one
member was detained on solicitation of prostitution charges).
47
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furthers Party control over local agents, but strengthens the commitment
those agents have to the Party.57 Within China’s authoritarian, communist
structure, the cadre system provides market signals in that it incentives
behavior with monetary reward.58
Failure to meet goals leads to demotions, salary reductions, and public
censure. Superiors attempt to meet their own performance standards by
establishing joint strict liability for those lower officials, even extending to
personal responsibility contracts with civilian, elected village leaders.59 The
widespread use of the cadre system and evaluation criteria has increased
state capacity to monitor and control lower-level agents.60 Variable and
sometimes conflicting criteria for a variety of policy goals lead to a
pressurized environment in which officials can be reduced to a reactionary
role.61
1.

China Has a Long History of Vertical Government Control Through
Responsibility and Incentive Systems

Evaluation and responsibility systems have existed in China since
organized government.62 The imperial system channeled a tremendous
amount of information to the emperor and relatively few magistrates. In
order to simplify the determinations of those who caused failures and for
what reason, responsibility systems attached strict and joint (collective)
liability.63 For example, the Ming Code applied collective criminal liability
to colleagues of magistrates who committed even inadvertent errors.
Control of state agents is a critical aspect of any government, one that
democratic states attempt to control from the bottom-up with elections. For
a brief period during the late years of Mao Zedong’s rule, the Party
abandoned a hierarchical cadre system and attempted to control the
bureaucracy from the bottom-up by fostering mass political campaigns and a
state of constant revolution.64 The resulting violence and instability gave
rise to the rebirth of a Leninist hierarchical order and cadre system as part of
the major reforms of the 1970s.65
57

Whiting, supra note 53, at 102.
Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10162.
59
Minzner, supra note 9, at 56.
60
Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a
Township Perspective, 173 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 35, 50 (2003).
61
Minzner, supra note 9, at 56, 68-70.
62
Id. at 63.
63
Id.
64
Edin, supra note 60, at 45.
65
Id. at 50; see also Minzner, supra note 9, at 66.
58
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The official promulgation of the modern cadre system occurred in
1979, when the Organization Department of the Party called for the
establishment of a new evaluation system for officials. The evaluations were
to consider political thought, organizational and leadership abilities,
familiarity with substantive issues, democratic work style, and actual
achievements.66 Actual achievements have become the primary focus, with
the most weight placed on numerical target goals capable of measurement.67
2.

The Establishment and Implementation of Evaluation Formulas
Reflects Regional Priorities

While the CCP sets the national policy for evaluation systems, city
and county level officials have considerable discretion in determining the
specific criteria and formula to reflect local conditions.68 Numerical goals
are typically weighted in tiers according to priority. The most important
goals gain “veto power,” in that the failure to achieve them trumps all other
accomplishments.69 These goals most typically are economic growth and
birth quota goals.70 In one county in Zhejiang in 1998, embezzlement of
over RMB 200,000, eruptions in violence resulting in a person’s death, and
the protests of over fifty people served as veto failures.71
The cadre system is flexible. Superior authorities set numerical goals,
leaving methods of attainment to lower officials.72 Because the evaluation
system and weighting within it is not law, those superior authorities may
change it quickly to reflect new priorities. The cadre system’s strict and
joint liability is particularly well suited for countries in which resources for
oversight of local government are limited, because it removes the need for
superior authorities to question why a failure occurred or whose
responsibility it was. However, this simplicity carries with it dangers of
falsification of results and human rights abuses.
The cadre system has become a primary means of monitoring and
controlling officials. It pervades every aspect of Chinese government,

66

Edin, supra note 60, at 102-03.
Minzner, supra note 9, at 79.
68
Whiting, supra note 53, at 106.
69
Minzner, supra note 9, at 100.
70
Id.
71
Edin, supra note 60, at 40.
72
In this way, the cadre system embraces an application of most cost-efficient solutions long
advocated by market theorists.
67
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including judicial resolution of civil disputes.73 The next section will outline
and assess the cadre system’s application.
III.

THE LPCWP’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CADRE SYSTEM HAS THE
POTENTIAL TO FORCE LOCAL OFFICIALS TO BECOME STAKEHOLDERS IN
WATER QUALITY ATTAINMENT

The ultimate test of an environmental regime’s effectiveness is
physical outcome,74 which for the purposes of this comment, is improvement
of water quality. The cadre system has the potential to improve water
quality because it will enlist the political and financial support of local
officials, which in turn will allow EPBs to more fully perform their job. The
political solution would allow the physical solution to occur.
The cadre system will convert local officials into stakeholders in
water quality attainment because it neatly fits China’s authoritarian
government structure and Confucian and Legalist legal traditions, as defined
and explained in Part B of this section. The cadre system also implements a
vertical hierarchy proven effective in the One Child Policy and increases
mediation in the judicial system.
A.

Because the CCP Has Extensively Used the Cadre System to Remedy
Administrative Deficiencies, It Provides a Known and Workable
Model

The cadre system uses an existing vertical hierarchy to connect central
and local governments.75 This is especially important considering the
confusion and lack of hierarchy in the Chinese legislative process.76 At the
national level, the National People’s Congress, the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, the State Council, and the Supreme Court all
have legislative powers. State-level Local People’s Congresses also have
legislative power of functionally equal hierarchy, and there is widespread
confusion in the judiciary regarding resolution of conflicts of law.77 In

73

Minzner, supra note 9, at 72.
Arild Underdal, One Question, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS 1, 11
(Miles et al. eds., MIT Press 2002) (discussing regimes broadly, including international treaty regimes).
75
Jiang, supra note 47, at 32.
76
Mitzi Huang, Seeds of Legal Discontent, The Luoyang Seed Case: A Case Study of the Rule of
Law in China, 3 DARTMOUTH C. UNDERGRADUATE J. OF L. 32, 32 (2005).
77
Id. at 32-33.
74
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contrast, the CCP has a streamlined vertical hierarchy from county-level
officials to the General Secretary,78 largely avoiding conflicting policies.79
The cadre system is an attractive means of meeting the challenge of
regulating the environment with minimal resources because it shrinks the
complexity of regulation. Rather than implementing central oversight of the
regulation of millions of pollution sources, the provisions apply a relatively
simple output standard to water bodies and leave the attainment of those
standards to local officials. Streamlining of oversight is especially important
given the enormity and complexity of China’s environmental challenges.
China’s leaders must manage a nation with severely depleted and
compromised natural resources, while serving a population five times as
large as the United States. They must strive to pull roughly one hundred
thirty million people out of poverty,80 while restructuring an economy that
imports much of the developed world’s pollution. They must do so with a
relatively young legal system, developing rule of law, and a limited
regulatory state. The challenges of monitoring and enforcing a command
and control system of environmental regulation are enormous in every
setting. This can be seen in an example in the United States. In 1997, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spent over seven billion U.S.
dollars,81 yet in 1998 estimated that rates of significant noncompliance for
major facilities were 20% under the Clean Air Act, 21-28% under the
Resource and Recovery Conservation Act, and at least 7% under the Clean
Water Act.82 These low levels of compliance, achieved at enormous cost in a
system with strong rule of law, demonstrate the difficulty of environmental
enforcement.
The paramount importance of interpersonal relationships and
reputation within the CCP furthers central control because high-level
officials can grant obedient lower-level officials power through the social
prestige of high-level connections.83 Central leaders, using the cadre system
78
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and other means, single out and identify promising local leaders to fast-track
their careers. For example, central officials invite favored young party
members to attend the Central Party School, a three-month to yearlong
vacation, training opportunity, and networking event.84 In a system based on
personal connections, social pressure serves to accomplish political
objectives. Because party membership is perceived as a requisite for
financial success, the CCP is bigger, younger, and more educated than ever
before.85 These future leaders, because of hierarchical control, are
incentivized to comply with party directives, with this incentive serves as the
critical vertical link in a centralized authoritarian state.
The measured successes of the One Child Policy and increases in
judicial mediation, explained within, demonstrate that this regulatory
mechanism is blunt, best suited for easily measureable problems, and easiest
to implement when attempting to regulate a vulnerable population. Because
water quality and its causal connection with pollution sources and cleanup
efforts is inherently complex, attenuated over time and space,86 and requires
the regulation of politically and economically powerful actors, the
provisions are likely to be most effective in curtailing high-profile,
significant pollution. Unlike the One Child Policy and judicial mediation,
water quality attainment requires the utilization of regulatory agencies.
1.

The One Child Policy and Encouragement of Mediation as a Judicial
Mechanism Serve as Examples of the Brutal Effectiveness of the
Cadre System

The One Child Policy has become a symbol in the West of draconian
policies and limitations of personal freedom. The Chinese government has
repressed the fundamental desire to reproduce through a policy which
severely affects women, particularly poor women in rural areas.87 However,
in achieving the desired result, the policy has worked, as scientists agree that
it has prevented approximately 250 million births.88
In the face of a population crisis and determined to markedly improve
GDP, Deng Xiaoping implemented the One Child Policy in 1980 with a
84
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revised Marriage Law. The law delayed the age of legal marriage, provided
free contraception to married couples, and limited births to one child per
couple. It codified a policy of limiting population growth and made it
compulsory.
As with environmental regulations, decentralized regulation left to
local officials with limited national oversight was ineffective and
inconsistent. When politically decentralized policy implementation failed to
produce the desired results, the Communist Party Central Committee and the
State Council decided to employ the cadre system. The 1991 “Decision on
Stepping Up Family Planning Work and Strictly Controlling Population
Growth” entrusted senior party officials at each level with responsibility for
supervising birth control in regions under their administration. According to
the new “family-planning target management responsibility contracts”
announced in this Decision, the performance of party leaders and
government officials is assessed on the basis of their “achievement” of the
allocated birth quotas for their areas. Failure to keep the number of births
within the quota could mean demotion, stiff fines, or the loss of bonuses.89
In most areas, birth quotas were given top priority in the cadre system
evaluations, with veto power.
Like the LPCWP provisions, the One Child Policy incentivizes
enforcement of a previously unenforced mandate and allows discretion in
the method of attaining numerical goals. In the case of the One Child
Policy, the cadre system has been so successful that China must now contend
with a population bottleneck.90
The judicial system provides another example of the rigid
effectiveness of the cadre system in attaining at least a rough proxy for
desired outcomes. Judges face targets and resulting evaluation points for
rates of mediation, case closures, and appellate reversals.91 Higher court
officials bear responsibility for the attainment of inferior judges.92 Most
recently, Chinese authorities have favored mediation as the preferred
outcome and established high rate targets. As a result, from 2004 to 2008,
mediation rates increased 137%, with some local courts mediating 99% of
cases.93 The attainment of these results unavoidably resulted in sacrifices of
litigants’ rights and just outcomes.
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History Suggests That the Cadre System Will Force at Least Rough
Compliance with Policy Goals

The examples of the One Child Policy and encouragement of
mediation are distinguishable from water quality attainment in that they
impose incentives directly on government actors.
The LPCWP’s
implementation of the cadre system, on the other hand, gambles that
properly incentivized local officials will support the EPBs in order to gain an
outcome. The former examples are further distinguished in that the
government actors carry out the policies against relatively powerless actors,
whereas polluters are often wealthy and politically well connected.
The One Child Policy has been so effective in part because it
mobilizes the power of the state against relatively powerless individuals.94 It
has been least effective against wealthy and connected families.95 Similarly,
the judiciary in China is weak and litigants have few enforceable procedural
rights. The LPCWP, in contrast, seeks to regulate industry, the wealthiest
and most powerful player in Chinese society.
Because the LPCWP employs indirect incentives and regulates
powerful actors, it is likely to be less effective than the One Child Policy and
encouragement of judicial mediation. However, these policies provide
cogent examples of the power, danger, and limitations of incentivizing local
officials to carry out national standards. It has been a successful yet blunt
means of quickly attacking a pressing and complicated problem. Experience
suggests that similar provisions in the LPCWP will serve to incentivize the
cleanup and prevention of easily recognizable pollution. The power of the
enforcement policy is that it uses the power of the party rather than the court,
but that is also a limitation. Methods and degree of enforcement will remain
inconsistent and unpredictable beyond achieving the result.
In sum, the cadre system, if implemented with sufficient weight given
in evaluation systems, will push local officials to become stakeholders in
environmental regulation. That process would be enhanced and legitimized
by allowing further public involvement. However, the complexity of water

94
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quality attainment96 exceeds that of other social policies implemented by the
cadre system and will require the aid of EPBs, as discussed in section IV.
B.

The Cadre System Effectively Engages Chinese Cultural and Political
History

While the substantive provisions of the LPCWP largely reflect
American environmental laws, the accountability provisions mark a turn
toward Chinese methods of enforcement. Employing the cadre system
should be effective because an implementation structure already exists, and
the cadre system reflects China’s legal and cultural history.
Chinese environmental laws have largely adopted a command and
control structure from western democracies with developed administrative
states.97 That strategy has not been well-suited to China, due to its
decentralized government structure, nascent administrative state, limited rule
of law, and common reliance on cooperative mechanisms that use social
pressure and connections to bargain for compliance.98 Thus, those
environmental laws have failed not only in securing compliance from
pollution emitters, but also in achieving widespread political investment of
local officials.
Beyond structural differences, part of this failure has been due to a
cultural misapplication. Western schools of legal thought attempt to separate
the individual holding the office from their official capacity.99 Furthermore,
separation from politics legitimizes law as an objective force in Western
society.100 In contrast, the Confucian legal tradition views the government
official as a moral and legal example to his constituents. While the state is
specifically atheist, governmental philosophy reflects Confucianism through
paternalism and belief in man’s ability to shape nature for its benefit.101
Officials in Imperial China, popularly known as fumu guan (parent official),
had broad political, legal, and personal power over citizens with a
correspondingly broad obligation to oversee the general welfare in both the
96
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private and public sphere.102 While the Confucian ethic dominated,
Legalism was its constant balance, preaching limitation of officials’
discretion through equal application of law to official and commoner alike
and the benefits of uniformity, consistency, and predictability.103 Unlike
Western legal thought, however, Legalism stresses group accountability for
individual wrongs.104
Application of the cadre system to a command-and-control water law
pursues the same goals of accountability that American environmental laws
achieve with citizen suits. In channeling accountability to the wellestablished CCP bureaucracy rather than the nascent judiciary, the law
effectively puts a “Chinese face” on environmental law.105 The cadre system
combines these philosophies in that it treats the official as a morally
responsible individual agent, yet applies quantitative measures with strict
joint liability.
Professor Carl Minzner argues that the system derives from functional
rather than cultural conditions, citing as evidence the use of strict joint
liability systems of agent control in Medieval England and elsewhere.106
However, while the cadre system may not arise from strictly cultural norms,
it is justified and implemented within a cultural context. This context, of
hierarchical liability regulating official behavior in both a moral and goaloriented sense, makes the cadre system well suited to Chinese governance.
Chinese cultural history creates a hospitable environment for this means of
enforcement and heightens its chance of success.
Confucianism is a form of social thought that dominated family and
legal thought in dynastic China,107 and continues to guide Chinese culture.
The basic tenants are those of culturally imposed duty between a lesser and a
superior. If every member of a society acts according to his duty in those
relations, the society as a whole would function smoothly.108 This creates a
political system based on custom, in which individuals are ruled by persons
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rather than laws,109 to the extent that some scholars hesitate to even term it a
legal system.110
The establishment of personal political accountability within a vertical
governmental structure reflects Confucian values, as does granting officials
discretion in determining how to implement a regulatory system. However,
tying local officials’ performance to nationally mandated standards and
subjecting those officials to punishment diverts from Confucianism in that it
tempers discretion and removes legally privileged status.
In applying objective standards to control official action, the cadre
system reflects legalist principles. Early legalist scholars questioned the
attainability of a Confucian political system based on ethics, and advocated
for law as a means to control self-interest and generate stability.111 A legalist
system favored comprehensive national standards and gained ground with
the collapse of the feudal system in 221 B.C. under the Ch’in and Han
dynasties.112 Legalist underpinnings are evidenced in the punitive measures
available in a cadre system. By contrast, under a pure Confucian ideology,
leaders rule by example, are not subject to punishment without imperial
decree, and ideally would never have to punish.113
The provisions balance influences of both Confucianism and legalism
in creating an enforcement provision uniquely suited to Chinese culture and
regulatory resources. It recognizes the duty of officials to protect their
people and imposes an ethic upon them. At the same time, by creating
incentives coupled with national standards, it standardizes their political
will, acknowledges self-interest, and guides that interest toward protecting
water resources. Rather than make regulation apolitical, they standardize
and incorporate politics as a tool to achieve legal ends. This balance of
elements from the Chinese legal tradition represents a promising direction in
regulatory law.
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EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CADRE SYSTEM WILL REQUIRE
COOPERATION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAUS

The cadre system will only be a successful political and physical
solution leading to sustainable results if it incentivizes a shift in institutional
priorities and creates real structural change in the form of empowerment of
EPBs at all levels. Without that step, it will serve only to address immediate
symptoms and will leave in place the fundamental problems of insufficient
political and financial power for effective environmental enforcement.114
Without structural changes, there are glaring practical and legal
weaknesses in an upstream regulatory strategy that relies on local officials to
bring about enforcement. This strategy first assumes that water quality is an
objective fact and that performance will be measurable.115 It further assumes
accurate reporting. In order to make those assumptions reality, Chinese
EPBs will have to supplement national water quality standards with
watershed-specific goals, and independently report results. A further
difficulty is the schizophrenic demands created by an incentive structure that
rewards one person for both economic growth and environmental protection.
The cadre system takes the fundamental problem that both command and
control and market based systems face, of balancing economic growth and
conservation, and places it squarely on local agents. Because officials lack
the tools to manage the complexities of water quality, in order to be
successful, the cadre system in the LPCWP requires the expertise of the
EPBs.
Fortunately, the cadre system also has the potential to facilitate EPB
enforcement, because it removes its largest impediment: local officials.
Enforcement has been limited by lack of political authority and lack of
resources, which in turn has created perverse fining incentives. Enlistment
of local officials as stakeholders should help to secure improved political
and financial support.
A.

The Cadre System Will Only Improve Water Quality to the Extent That
EPBs Can Provide Measurable Standards and Report Accurate Data

The examples cited in this comment, the One Child Policy and
encouragement of judicial mediation, are easily countable and subject to
relatively direct solutions. Indeed, the strength of the cadre system is the
114

ECONOMY, supra note 34, at 21.
U.S.
Env.
Protection
Agency,
Performance
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/nepps/performance_measures.htm (discussing the “information
associated with building a results-oriented management system”).
115

Measures,
challenges

MARCH 2011

INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE

419

simplicity and accountability of applying clear, hard numbers and
instructions.116 In the water law context, however, the cadre system will
only create political space for EPBs to fill, and its physical success will
depend on the EPBs’ capacity to do so.
1.

An Evaluation System Requires Accurate Data to be Physically
Effective

To be anything more than a stopgap measure to address crisis episodes
of obvious pollution, the cadre system will require consistent, accurate,
reported data. The cadre system works best for numerical target goals
capable of being measured.117 The MEP possesses the technology and
institutional capability to do so, as evidenced by its comprehensive 2009
water quality report. However, those reports must be more consistent to
render useful data over time.
2.

Falsification of Reporting Represents a Major Problem that Can Only
be Resolved by Frequent Testing and Reporting by Higher-Level EPBs

The cadre system works by incentivizing compliance based on selfinterest. However, the strongest incentive for self-interested officials is to
falsify data, allowing them to collect the benefits of attainment without
spending resources. In the environmental context, falsifying officials could
achieve economic growth through polluting industries and simply provide
fake water quality statistics. Moreover, a vertical hierarchy system
encourages collaboration between actors at the same level.118
Studies in China have found widespread falsification within the cadre
system. A 2008 survey of 316 villages found that eighty-one percent of the
officials lied about their village income data, with an average of a forty-four
percent discrepancy.119 To combat this inflation, high-level officials conduct
elaborately secretive detection tours. Under one method, officials were
given three sealed envelopes to open at different stages in their journey to
check reported birth statistics in a village, each one directing them to the
next location on a sort of sleuthing scavenger hunt. Village officials were
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still able to evade this system by tracking government license plate
numbers.120
Cooperative falsification can be beaten by monitorable facts.121 Water
quality provides distinct advantages in that it is not readily moved (as
children are under the One Child Policy) or hidden (as income data is with
falsified forms). It is objectively testable, but requires concrete standards
and testing and reporting procedures. Because of political constraints,
previous accountability testing has required national-level enforcement
campaigns.122 However, campaigns lack the consistency to measure
improvement and achieve long-term behavior modification.123 Furthermore,
they do not provide the necessary institutional changes needed for consistent
enforcement.124
B.

Enforcement Problems Largely Result From Political Interference
and Lack of Funding, Obstacles That Should Be Removed if Local
Officials Become Stakeholders

The provisions rest on an assumption that local officials will respond
to incentives by forcing environmental enforcement officials to work harder,
forcing local industry to comply with regulations and reduce polluting
activities, and to bear environmental interests in mind when financing and
permitting projects. However, in the face of powerful polluting enterprises,
constituents eager for economic development, and limited monitoring and
enforcement resources, such demands may in some situations be impossible
within existing structures. Incentivized local officials could remedy this by
providing political and financial backing.
1.

Given Weak Enforcement Tools and Cultural Preference,
Environmental Officials in China Currently Rely on Cooperative
Enforcement, but Political Backing Could Result in Stronger
Regulation

Scant enforcement is the basis for the implementation of the cadre
system in the LPCWP. The direct and indirect opposition by political
officials has contributed to weak cooperative enforcement.125
120
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Administrative agencies look to local governments at their own level for
enforcement powers.126
For instance, a 1998 study of six Chinese EPBs found that each
agency rarely enforced violations through the courts due to the costs, lack of
legal training, and a desire to keep strong connections with polluting
enterprises.127 The agencies almost never removed permits for violations or
assessed fines for false permits, for fear that the severity of removal and
public accusations of cheating would upset connections and social wellbeing.128 They rarely assessed compound fees for lack of payment or fines
for late payment.129
Proponents of cooperative enforcement assert a belief that
partnerships and education preserve positive relationships between a
regulator and regulated enterprise, facilitating enforcement with reduced
transaction costs.130 Scholars claim that it reflects a cultural preference for
solving problems through social relationships131 and a lack of resources and
political power to enforce. However, it cannot be effective without a source
of power from which to bargain.
It is that lack of power that appears to be crucial in choice of
enforcement mechanism. EPB staff stated in interviews that they didn’t
collect late fees because they feared that by penalizing enterprises, they
might never collect any fees at all.132 Political pressures on local EPBs to
ignore violations by wealth-producing emitters have been so strong that
local EPB employees have resorted to writing anonymous letters to central
EPB officials reporting violations for fear of being punished for hampering
local development.133 Lessening these pressures would go a long way
toward facilitating enforcement.
The same analysis applies to courts, which are also funded by the
local government.134 Decisions are subject to political review at the local
126
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level, and so the values of local officials are critical to judicial
implementation of the LPCWP.
2.

Increased Local Funding Would Remove the Perverse Incentives that
Cause EPBs to Rely on Polluting Industry for Funding

EPBs rely on local officials for funding. In the past, funding has been
limited because officials were rewarded almost entirely by economic
growth, which the EPBs generally curtailed. Lack of funding resulted in
both an incapacity to properly enforce regulations and a partnership with
polluting industries. If incentivized local officials direct funds toward EPBs,
these barriers may be removed. In this way, the cadre system has the
potential to significantly enhance enforcement.
Officials further blamed failures to enforce permit standards on the
expense of monitoring, lack of quality monitoring equipment, and resulting
weak data.135 As a result, the EPBs simply relied on data provided by the
enterprises and pursued monitoring only if the data did not make sense on its
face.136 This shortage has directly caused lack of enforcement, and
indirectly aligned the interests of the regulators and polluters.
EPBs have grown perversely dependant on pollution, and assess fines
and fees at a level that encourages enterprises to pollute in order to seek the
highest profits.137 The EPBs chose low fines largely due to funding
pressures. In 1994, municipal EPBs were funded eighty-seven percent by
fees, municipal environmental monitoring centers sixty-nine percent,
municipal environmental inspection stations one hundred percent, and
district and county EPBs ninety-five percent.138 Staff reported collecting
fees with the goal of increasing revenue rather than ensuring compliance.139
Even a small amount of local funding would significantly increase the
independence of EPBs and enhance their regulatory authority. The cadre
system has the potential to incentivize such funding.
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Despite Potential Benefits, the Incentive Strategy of the Cadre System
is Not Well-Suited to the Long-Term, Watershed-Scale Management
Required to Attain Comprehensive Water Quality

This comment has argued that the cadre system as implemented in
Article 5 of the LPCWP has the potential to shift institutional priorities and
incentivize water quality improvement. However, because the cadre system
implements short-term goals, these improvements will likely be limited to
pollution curable with short-term, high-yield fixes. This will likely include
substantial point sources due to their direct causation and individually
significant impact, but will have limited ability to correct collective nonpoint source pollution problems.
Water quality presents a holistic watershed-based problem requiring
sustained regulation across multiple jurisdictions.140 Improvement has
proven to be a nebulous and long-term endeavor in which protection projects
often have no demonstrated link to actual cleaner conditions.141 Water
quality, particularly in lakes and ponds with limited flushing capacity,
involves myriad variables acting on an unpredictable timescale. It fluctuates
widely based on precipitation and biological cycles.
Surveys of
environmental protection agencies in the U.S. have found that none have
been able to provide accurate predictive measures of the effectiveness of
compliance programs.142 Watershed managers and biologists now know that
restoring water quality and resulting biodiversity requires the restoration of
entire watersheds and the systems acting within them.143 The impacts of
human activity are cumulative over space and time, and mitigating them
requires consistent effort to restore system processes rather than discrete
problems.144
The necessities of conservation conflict with the cadre system in both
geographic scope and time. National level leaders can solve geographic
scope issues by evaluating regional or provincial-level officials according to
a broad area’s water quality attainment. Those leaders would then in turn
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delegate responsibility to local leaders to meet certain goals.145 The problem
remains, however, of determining the source of pollution. Any individual
leader not in compliance could simply blame the failure on someone
upstream. In this instance, the cadre system of joint liability would serve
well by establishing collective responsibility for a collective resource. Joint
liability would theoretically incentivize the most cost-effective fixes, but
would encounter significant commons problems.
Time is a more difficult challenge. Because evaluation systems
include annual review and officials are rotated on short tenures to avoid
localism, evaluation systems are best applied to short-term, localized
problems and solutions.146 Officials often rush to meet goals in name, rather
than substance. This haste to meet performance goals has resulted in
widespread falsification (as discussed previously), as well as reactionary and
wasteful programs. For instance, to satisfy industrial growth goals, one
county official directed each village under him to build a paper mill, making
the completion a priority in the village leaders’ evaluations. Each village
built a mill, the official was promoted and rotated, and within five years,
each mill was out of business.147
As a result of the rotation system and brief tenure of officials, they are
likely to invest financial and political resources only in quickly achievable
goals. Just as the United States’ Environmental Protection Agency first used
the Clean Water Act148 to address point sources and is only now beginning to
attack more challenging non-point sources, Chinese officials will likely
focus their attention on major point-source emitters because they are the
easiest to find and fix.
V.

BECAUSE THE CADRE SYSTEM IS UNDEMOCRATIC AND OPAQUE, THE
CCP SHOULD INTEGRATE CITIZEN REPORTING TO INCREASE
TRANSPARENCY AND KEEP OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE

This comment focuses on a results-oriented analysis. However, it is
important to note that adoption of the cadre system operates in a context of a
troubling, broader shift toward authoritarianism and CCP rule.149 In
embracing a political solution that operates within a closed system, the cadre
145
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system encourages officials to disregard citizens’ legal rights. Particularly in
the implementation of the One Child Policy, officials have committed
atrocities in order to meet strict goals.150 The cadre system further sacrifices
citizen involvement and legal consistency in pursuit of those results. Doing
so is not only undemocratic and contrary to Chinese constitutional
principles, it is also risky because it alienates a potentially enormous class of
overseers, and stakes governmental legitimacy on attaining water quality
improvement. The cadre system focuses power within the party, but in
doing so, also focuses responsibility. In addition, it educates citizens to
engage in more and more disruptive protest in order to achieve change,
which could pose a long-term threat to stability.151
A.

By Integrating Citizen Response, the CCP Could Maximize the
Transparency and Effectiveness the Cadre System

The cadre system, while inherently opaque, could easily be adjusted to
allow greater citizen involvement. ‘The seeds of public accountability
already exist in an increasingly rights-conscious public, a newly legislated
requirement to divulge water quality data, a complaint procedure, and an
evaluation system based on those complaints. Unfortunately, that public
voice and accountability has largely been stifled by the CCP’s unwillingness
to cede any challenges to its authority.152 While current evaluation systems
consider public opinion in an annual “democratic appraisal meeting,” only
village leaders, lower officials, and leaders of key enterprises may attend
such meetings.153 The cadre system therefore largely operates as an invisible
hand in governance.
Public outcry over water pollution already exists in China. Citizens
have instead voiced their complaints through the Environmental Protection
Bureaus’ complaint divisions. From 1991 to 1993, EPBs reported that
citizens registered 55,000 complaint letters and 80,000 in-person complaints,
with ninety percent of those complaints relating to water or noise
pollution.154
In 2006, the government controlled English-language
newspaper China Daily reported that more than 50,000 disputes and protests
arose in 2005 over pollution, and complaints to the national environmental
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administration rose by thirty percent.155
While
the
Administrative
Litigation Law and the Environmental Protection Law include citizen-suit
provisions, such suits are incredibly rare.156
Many of the 55,000 complaint letters were submitted anonymously,
evidence of continued fear of party reprisal.157 However, a burgeoning
environmental movement and the development of an increasingly large and
attentive corps of “netizens” promises to heighten and broaden public outcry.
The “spotlight pressure” of public attention is a proven means of pushing
officials to environmental compliance.158
Widespread criticism has
successfully regulated spending in key policy areas, showing that the cadre
system presently is at least minimally responsive to citizen complaint and
protest.159 However, such criticism is risky for citizens and generally only
occurs as a desperate measure.
B.

The CCP Should Exercise the Existing Statutory Authority and
Petition System to Integrate Citizen Response

Article 19 of the LPCWP mandates that the national government
publish national water quality standards and also the names of provinces that
fail to meet the standards. It remains to be seen in the implementing
regulations whether provincial leaders will focus the same publicity on city
and county governments. This localized transparency would help to focus
responsibility and identify areas needing increased agency resources, as well
as providing better data and accountability to combat falsification.
The traditional avenue for citizen complaint in China is via petition to
relevant authorities, under the xinfang system. 160 The xinfang system works
in conjunction with the cadre system to direct accountability measures
toward political, rather than judicial solutions.161 This approach allows great
access, especially for the poor, but due to limited regulations and broad
155
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institutional discretion, rarely limits governmental power in a significant
way.162 Under some evaluation formulas xinfang petitions of a certain size
that reach higher-level officials result in score deductions.163 Savvy
protesters can threaten protest to leverage an official’s desire to meet social
harmony goals.164 While this use of the cadre system can successfully
motivate officials, structural problems remain that severely limit their ability
to enforce environmental law. Like the cadre system, the xinfang system
works to enhance the vertical movement of information within the
government.165
Publicity accompanied with political accountability could serve to
create the Chinese equivalent of citizen-suit enforced environmental laws,
within a political system. While China lacks an independent judiciary and
tradition of legal challenge to the government, the party mechanism provides
a powerful means of forcing regulatory action. In past incidents of
significant water pollution, high-level officials have satisfied public outcry
by firing officials.166 These firings have resulted in higher water quality.
Accountability structures and regular public disclosure of water quality
standards could serve to codify and make consistent that practice, leading to
political accountability to public opinion. The cadre system would be more
powerful and more stable if the CCP took public accountability seriously
and institutionalized procedures for consistently hearing and accounting for
complaints. Such an approach is more realistic in an authoritarian system
than robust citizen suit, but it could attain some of the same benefits.
VI.

CONCLUSION

China’s application of the cadre system to environmental law is a
pragmatic use of political resources that could jumpstart regulation and
improve the severe instances of pollution. However, it will only be
successful if the political incentives lead to a shift in institutional priorities
that results in enhanced enforcement capacity. Recruiting local officials as
stakeholders in attaining water quality has a potential to facilitate that shift
by creating a culture of environmental regulation and provide EPBs with
political and financial backing.
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This comment recognizes that the cadre system inflicts serious
procedural and substantive abuses of citizens’ legal rights. Those concerns
are real—it is imperative to develop an approach toward environmental
protection that takes account of Chinese circumstances without
accommodating them so completely as to surrender all possibilities of
fostering improvement.167
While much attention has been paid to the Chinese import of Western
environmental regulation strategies, an incentive based system with personal
accountability provides a compelling model for export. Local agency
problems are endemic to every environmental enforcement regime, because
national standards must be generic while local application is case-specific.168
An evaluation system with concrete targets and public involvement
represents a compelling compromise between the efficiency of a marketbased incentive system and the standardization of the command-and-control
system.
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